On the basis of the definition, we can find in clause 2 (11) “undisclosed asset located outside India” means an asset (including financial interest in any entity) located outside India, held by the assessee in his name or in respect of which he is a beneficial owner, and he has no explanation about the source of investment. This is, more or less, expansion of section 139. If we go further, clause 4 also defines like that. Finally, we can very easily find out how the architecture of this Bill is repeated on the basis of the Income-tax Act. The Income-tax Act is also having the Assessing Officer. It is having its own hierarchy of officers who go into it. If the officer has given a verdict, then, about that, there is an appeal provision given for the Tax Appellate Tribunal. Similarly, the Tax Appellate Tribunal is vested with the same powers in this Bill for the violation also. Then, they can go to the High Court, and finally they can end up in Supreme Court. This is the architecture on which this Bill is made. That means we are repeating the same Act which is already there in the Income-tax Act, and we are culling out certain provisions, and defining it further, and saying that we want to stop the black money. Actually, we are not addressing the problem which we have promised to the people. In the international convention also we have shown such a position, and I will quote from article 3 of the international / Convention: “This Convention shall apply, in accordance with its terms, to the prevention, investigation and prosecution of corruption and to the freezing, seizure, confiscation and return of the proceeds of offences established in accordance with this Convention. This is the promise you have made. We have accepted this Convention. But now we have not mentioned anything on the topic of prevention, investigation; only the prosecution is there. This is nothing on the freezing, seizure, confiscation and return of the proceeds of offences. That means, we just want to make a white washing of our own enactments, feeling that we are very much interested in abolishing black money, and, therefore, we are bringing a law. But really we are making that law. We are just evading our international commitment which we made. One has to disclose the source of his income. The object of keeping such a wide power with this Court has been to see that injustice is not perpetuated or perpetrated by decisions of courts below. More so, there should be a question of law in general public importance or a decision which shocks the conscience of the court are some of the prime requisites for grant of special leave. Thus, unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist that substantial and grave injustice has been done and that the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity warranting review of the decision appealed against, such exercise should not be done. The power under Article 136 cannot be used to short circuit the legal procedure prescribed in overriding power. This Court generally does not permit a party to by-pass the normal procedure of appeal or reference to the High Court unless a question of principle of great importance arises. It has to be exercised exceptionally and with caution and only in such an extra-ordinary situation. More so, such power is to be exercised taking into consideration the well-established principles which govern the exercise of overriding constitutional powers. It is true that this Court when exercises its discretionary power under Article 136 or passes an order under Article 142, it does so with great care and due circumspection. But, when we are settling the law in exercise of this court’s discretion, such law, so settled, should be clear and become operational instead of being kept vague, so that it could become a binding precedent in all similar cases to arise in future.” It has been canvassed before us that under Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court is competent to pass any order to do complete justice between the parties and grant decree of divorce even if the case may not meet the requirement of statutory provisions. The instant case presents special features warranting exercise of such power. We are fully alive of the fact that this court has been exercising the power under Article 142 of the Constitution for dissolution of marriage where the Court finds that marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead, beyond salvage and has broken down irretrievably, even if the facts of the case do not provide ground in law on which the divorce could be granted. (800)
