The appellant was, thus, held guilty also of causing the knife injury to Rakesh and came to be convicted under section 324 in addition to section 302 of the Penal code. Under section 324, he was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year. He was also convicted under section 25 of the Arms Act by a separate judgment of the trial court dated February 2, 1998 in Sessions case No. 26 of 1993 and sentenced to a period of imprisonment already undergone as under-trial. Against the two judgments of the trial court, three appeals were filed in the High Court. The High Court by the judgment and order coming under appeal dismissed all the three appeals and the revision and, thus, upheld the judgments of the trial court in all aspects. Mr. Sahai, Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellant assailed the High Court and the trial court judgments and contended that the appellant’s conviction for the offence of murder was not sustainable both in law and on facts. Mr. Sahai submitted that there was at least four circumstances that falsified and completely demolished the prosecution case. First, there was a patent contradiction between the prosecution case and the motive assigned by it to the accused for committing the crime. Secondly, it was undeniable that injuries were fabricated both on the person or the deceased and Rakesh, the only eye witness whose evidence was accepted by the High Court. At the time when the plea was raised before the High Court that the impugned orders are vitiated on account of the non-supply of enquiry report, it would have been appropriate for the High Court to examine the averments made in the writ petition. A perusal of the writ petition would show that the petitioner has failed to lay any foundation to establish that any prejudice has been caused by the non-supply of the enquiry report. No prejudice was actually caused to the respondent. There was no failure of justice in the facts and circumstances of this case by non-supply of the enquiry report to the respondent. The punishment imposed on the respondent cannot be said to be disproportionate to the gravity of the charges proved against the respondent. The charges related to the conduct of the respondent in a financial institution whereby he procured pecuniary benefits for himself. Further, assessee makes the agricultural produce of its members. It retains the sale proceeds in many cases. It is this “retained amount” which was payable to its members, from whom produce was brought, which was invested in short-term deposits or securities. Such an amount, which was retained by the assessee Society, was a liability and it was shown in the balance-sheet on the liability-side. Therefore, to that extent, such interest income cannot be said to be attributable either to the activity mentioned in section 80P(2) of the Act. Therefore, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the Assessing Officer was right in taxing the said interest income, u/s 56 of the Act. To say that the source of income is not relevant for deciding the applicability of section 80P of the Act would not be correct because weightage needs be given to the words “the whole of the amount of profits and gains of business” attributable to one of the activities specified in section 80P(2)(a) of the Act. The words the whole of the amount of profits and gains of business” emphasize that the income in respect of which deduction is sought must constitute the operational income and not the other income which accrues to the Society. As regards validity of the notice u/s148 of the Act to re-open the assessment, it essentially concerns factual aspect. The Tribunal is the final fact-finding Authority under the Act. It has given a finding of fact that though the written communication of the sanction, which has no prescribed format, was received by the Assessing Officer on 8th June, 2001 but, the approval or sanction for reopening of assessment in terms of secction 148 of the Act read with section151 existed even prior to 31st May, 2001. There is no reason to interfere with this finding of fact given by the Tribunal. In the instant matter, the question “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the income by way of interest on deposits held with scheduled banks, bonds and other securities was chargeable to tax u/s 56 under the head ‘Income from other sources’ without allowing any deduction in respect of cost of funds. (800)
